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The 2018 National Defence Strategy (NDS) unveiled by the Pentagon 
can be encapsulated in three words ‘compete, deter and win’. Key 
questions that arise are: What does it mean and how it gets manifested? 
NDS as the capstone document has been guiding the geopolitical 
discourse and global security developments. The Pentagon’s efforts to 
redraw its dominance strategy and course correct its two decades of 
distraction due to endless wars in Afghanistan and West Asia have 
already manifested in Sino-US relations. A decade of  ‘pivot to Asia’ 
policy put in place by Obama’s administration gathered storm during 
Trump’s tenure. 2018 NDS declared China and Russia as a strategic 
competitor. Washington’s assertion of widening the competitive space is 
based on the premise of seamlessly integrating the US “multiple elements 
of national power—diplomacy, information, economics, finance, 
intelligence, law enforcement, and military”.1 A closer examination of 
how the game gets played by the various national power elements under 
the new Biden administration will determine future policy directions 
against China and Russia. The lessons for India are ominous as it helps 
it to navigate the geo-strategic labyrinth. 
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The glossary of military terms used by the US Armed Forces may not 
contain the term ‘Non-Contact warfare’. However, the US strategic 
discourse reveals its practice. Non-contact warfare is defined as the 
form of warfare “in which states seek to employ all elements of national 
power […] to leverage their influence across multiple domains to target 
adversary’s population, sovereignty, governance structures and economy 
through non-military or military non-kinetic and kinetic means”.2 The 
intention is to intimidate, paralyse or denude politico-military response 
while enabling winning without fighting or fight with minimum use of 
physical contact of own forces. Hence, its manifestation is across traditional 
military operations-across land, maritime, and air, supported by space and 
cyberspace and non-traditional fields including civilian affairs. Thus, non-
contact warfare looks at a complete spectrum of warfare short of war 
waged by the civil-military combine. 
The conflict is likely to be primarily played in the non-military domain, 
escalating into military domains. Within the military domain, it can be 
non-lethal or lethal and kinetic or non-kinetic. The intent is to “keep the 
response measured and calibrated along the desired escalation matrix to 
remain ahead in the game of domination”.3 Therefore, winning along 
each escalation ladder is more important than victory. It allows favourable 
outcomes without ratcheting up the violence in the ever-increasing lethal 
and complex warfare environment of the 21st Century. 
The complex and contested global operating environment coupled 
with rapid dispersion and evolution of technologies and the new concept 
of warfare has prompted the Pentagon to articulate the 2018 NDS. The 
document steers the US long-term strategic approach. It aims to create 
a combat-credible military force capable of deterring war. It is nothing 
but the manifestation of non-contact warfare both in military and non-
military domains.
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The US Strategic Approach
American analysts believe that the past two decades have been a decade 
of distraction for the US due to its involvement in an endless war in 
Afghanistan and West Asia. They view the 2018 NDS as a course 
correction. Former Secretary of Defence General Mattis, assertion to 
guide American and allied forces to regain their lost edge over China 
has been the founding framework of this document. The intention to 
“compete, deter and win” is directed against China, Russia, North Korea, 
Iran and global terrorist organisations. However, China is the primary 
strategic competitor, followed by Russia. Pentagon believes that the 
Chinese actions against the Indo-Pacific region countries aim to gain 
regional hegemony in Indo-Pacific in the near term and ultimately achieve 
global pre-eminence.4 Hence, the 2019 US’ Indo-Pacific Strategy’ aims to 
contain Beijing’s predatory policies. Over the past three years, Washington 
has fast-paced policies, strategies and acts by publishing documents like 
National Security Strategy (2017), National Defence Strategy (2018), 
Nuclear Posture Review (2018), Missile Defence Review (2019), Taiwan 
Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI) Act 
(2019) and Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act (2019). It 
wishes to regain the lost strategic space ceded to China and Russia. The 
death of more than five hundred thousand US citizen to COVID-19 
has already resulted in the ouster of President Trump. The new Biden 
administration may find it difficult to ignore the scars left over by the 
‘Chinese Virus’.
The US, Russia and China seem to be locked in long-term strategic 
friction in an ever-evolving competitive security environment.5 As part of 
the great power rivalry, Washington feels it can expand the competitive 
space and seize the initiative to challenge the competitors where they 
lack strength. It is working on long-term strategic competition with 
“seamless integration of multiple elements of national power—diplomacy, 
information, economics, finance, intelligence, law enforcement, and 












military”.6 The US strategic approach spells out the need for “more 
lethal force, strong alliances and partnerships, American technological 
innovation, and a culture of performance”7 to achieve decisive military 
advantages. 
The Pentagon policy of increasing the competitive space across 
multiple domains of diplomacy, information, economics, finance, 
intelligence, law enforcement, and the military was evident in Trump’s 
administration power play. Series of actions across these multiple levels 
are likely to challenge the growing Chinese and Russian assertiveness. 
•	 Diplomatic Intransigence: Despite the change of guard at Washington, 
the US policy towards China and Russia appears unchanged. The rising 
competition and conflict with China have led to QUAD’s formation 
since the US, Japan, Australia and India have converged interests. 
The Biden administration will find it difficult to overturn Trump’s 
protectionist and nativist “America First” policy in the aftermath 
of the COVID-19 crisis precipitated by China. Both the countries 
have locked horns on a wide range of issues related to discriminatory 
trade barriers, forced technology transfer, the militarisation of the 
South China Sea, intimidating Taiwan, human rights and religious 
freedom, government-sponsored cyber-enabled economic espionage 
and Chinese interference in other countries’ political systems. Against 
Russia, the Biden administration may continue to play hardball to 
keep Russia tethered by neither mending nor further inflaming the 
relationship between them. 
•	 Exploiting the Economic Fault Line: The strategic competition focuses 
on obstructing China’s rise through two-fold measures. First, by 
decoupling the American economy from China’s through supply chain 
diversification and secondly delaying and disrupting China’s economic 
expansion by creating trade, tariff, and technology barriers. It aims to 
compel China to alter its behaviour. The US sees China’s Belt and Road 
Initiative (BRI) as Chinese economic aggression to create a client state 
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throughout the Indo-Pacific, Africa, the Middle East, Europe, and the 
Americas. While China views BRI to enhance its trade connectivity, 
reduce surplus domestic industrial capacity, develop poorer interior 
provinces, promote energy security, and internationalise Chinese 
industrial and financial standards. The growth of China’s global 
economic footprint makes it increasingly vulnerable to international 
and regional turmoil and terrorism. The PLA, mandated to protect 
China’s overseas interests, is therefore forced to look for overseas 
basing infrastructure to deal with threats to its global interest. Further, 
the Chinese financial expert, like former People’s Bank of China 
(PBOC) Governor Zhou Xiaochuan, advocates a larger global role for 
the yuan by displacing the dollar-denominated global financial system.8 
However, in the case of Russia, the US may continue using sanctions 
to hurt the pandemic-battered Russian economy. It allows the US to 
leverage its negotiations for the New START treaty with the Russian.
•	 Laying out Legal Labyrinth: Washington realises that the new cyber and 
space domain needs to navigate the trading partners’ legal labyrinth. 
To unlock the value chain for wealth generation, it needs to create 
business-friendly legislation to promote its companies’ interests. The 
headwind related to data sovereignty and the Internet of Things (IoT) 
has compelled it to make a compliant legal framework given the EU and 
Chinese legal requirement of data localisation and IPR related issues 
on content aggregation. To prevent the sale of arms and ammunition 
from adversaries like Russia and China, it has created legislations 
like Countering America’s Adversaries through the Sanctions Act 
(CATSAA). Similarly, it is influencing international legislation related 
to the autonomous system, use of global commons,9 and outer space.
•	 Military Modernisations and Capability Enhancement: The final 
Quadrennial Defence Review (QDR) of Obama’s administration 
sought the capability to defeat a regional aggressor and impose 
unacceptable costs on a second aggressor in another region. However, 












the Crimean conflict left the US red-faced as it showed its inability 
to secure favourable outcomes. Thus, the 2018 NDS imposes higher 
demands on the military. The NDS charges the military services with 
building a more lethal force, strengthening alliances and attracting 
new partners, and reforming Pentagon for greater performance and 
affordability. However, the 2018 NDS approach of ‘compete, deter, 
and win’ opens up the US military to a multi-front scenario. 
The US Operational Construct
The US prioritisation of preparedness for war looks at three things: 
First, to deter aggression across the Indo-Pacific, Europe, and West Asia; 
second, to degrade terrorist and WMD threats; and third, defend US 
interests from the challenges below the level of armed conflict. China 
and Russia, being strategic competitors, find themselves engaged across 
all spectrum of war. The concept of deterrence, degradation and defence 
employed by the US against these nuclear powers calls for restrained 
retaliation to prevent conflict escalation. For the US to maintain the 
force credibility and superiority, it needs to preserve its economic and 
technological dominance to navigate the international power play. The 
rules of the game by the US therefore include: 
•	 Be Strategically Predictable, But Operationally Unpredictable:10 To 
deter or defeat long-term strategic competitors’, the US intends to 
target its adversaries by introducing the concept of unpredictability 
through integrated actions planned in coordination with allies and 
partners. It aims to outmanoeuvre the competitors by stymieing 
their efforts, preventing them from exercising their options and 
compelling them to confront adverse conditions. The reliance is on 
the creation of lethal force by modernising capabilities in the new and 
niche domains. 
•	 Counter Coercion and Subversion through Integrated US Interagency 
Actions:11 The Chinese and Russian use of political subversion, 
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proxies, and the threat or use of military force to change facts on 
the ground has incensed the Pentagon. Besides this, the Chinese 
predatory economic method of technology transfers and IPR 
violations has prompted Washington to expand the competitive space. 
It exercises a series of combined US interagency actions through the 
State, Treasury, Justice, Energy, Homeland Security, Commerce, 
USAID, the Intelligence Community, law enforcement, and other 
departments. It seeks to counter Chinese and Russian coercive 
acts by identifying and addressing the vulnerabilities in economic, 
technological, and information areas. The trade, technology, and 
currency wars at play during the Trump era are the precursor to the 
larger games of dominance and disruption that are likely to unfold.
Examining the US Military Objectives
According to the US National Defense Strategy Commission, “America’s 
military superiority—the hard-power backbone of its global influence and 
national security—has eroded to a dangerous degree”.12 Hence, the 2018 
NDS is an essential strategic document guiding the Pentagon’s priorities, 
investments, and programming decisions. The prioritised objectives of 
deterring war, protecting the security of the country and winning the 
highly competitive conflicts remain a crucial concern for the US planners. 
The critical military objectives for Pentagon therefore are:
•	 Defending the Homeland from Attack: The 9/11 disaster at the start 
of the 21st Century compelled Pentagon to an out of area operations 
to exterminate global threats emanating outside the US soil. However, 
prolonged stability operations in Afghanistan and West Asia, coupled 
with the poor handling of the COVID-19, has shown the chinks in the 
US security apparatus. The US policymakers realise the graver threats in 
its inability to deal with engineered protests like the ‘#blacklifematters’ 
campaign that creates a societal cavity, the healing of which may 
take a long time. While advocating ‘massive retaliation’ and ‘left of 












launch strategy’ designed to counter CBRN and missile threats, the 
US policymakers are also looking at pre-empting terror acts or protest 
plots at home. It has created a Geographical Information Grid under 
the US Space Command and carried out interagency coordination to 
improve situational awareness across all domains.
•	 Defending Vital Interests through Deterrence: For the US to dominate 
world affairs, it knows that it has to protect its economic and financial 
dominance by retaining technological superiority. The envelope 
of cyberspace promoted through an aggressive space programme 
need protection. Pentagon also knows that deterrence is dependent 
on precision long-range stand-off vectors and missile defence 
capabilities. Hence, it aims to employ multi-domain measures to 
address its vulnerabilities, like creating unhackable communication 
and space-based interceptor layers. It has introduced the Arms 
Export Control Act (AECA) and International Emergency Economic 
Powers Act (IEEPA) to prevent evasion of export of sensitive military 
technologies. It is also looking at ways to prevent China from 
information harvesting under the garb of laws like National Security 
Law, Cyber Security Law, National Cyber Security Standards and 
Technical Committee Standards.
•	 Defending Allies from Military Aggression, Supporting Partners 
Against Coercion, and Fairly Sharing Responsibilities for Common 
Defence: This big charter makes Pentagon lo k at the Chinese 
coercion and anti-access and anti-denial (A2AD) strategy deployed 
in the Pacific against its allies, including Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, 
Philippines, and Micronesian republics. It also aims to demonstrate 
its ability to deter Russian invasion in the Baltics through credible 
combat capabilities. Against North Korea and Iran, it aims at 
employing punitive deterrence. All these entail a four-fold process. 
First, the US intends to maintain an adequate force in Indo-Pacific. 
Second, it would like to strengthen the EU and NATO forces against 
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the Russian threat. Third, improve its surveillance capabilities against 
states sponsoring terrorism. Fourth, evolve security mechanism to 
strengthen its partners and allies that allow it flexibility in intervention 
and engagement, if required.
Priorities for Military Modernisation
Unfortunately, the 2018 NDS creates a strategy resource gap for the US. 
It needs to handle two peer nuclear competitors China and Russia, two 
rogue nuclear states in North Korea and Iran and tackle the unfinished wars 
in Afghanistan and Iraq with the threat of terrorism looming large with 
increasing footprints and varied manifestations. Freedom of navigation 
exercise by the US and its allies in the South China Sea and long-range 
joint air patrol by Russia and China over the South Korean Air Defence 
Identification Zone (ADIZ) on 23 July 2019 is a precursor to testing 
tolerance by adversaries and hotting up of the grey-zone competition. 
Russia and China are likely to employ disruptive measures short of war 
using multiple tools of statecraft to expand their influence and weaken US 
alliances and partnerships. Near simultaneous contingencies will stretch 
US resources and may undermine its deterrence and coercive ability. 
Washington priorities remain to increase US influence and preserve 
market access. It, therefore, needs a military with credible combat power 
capable of operating across the entire spectrum of conflict. The priorities 
of military modernisation as identified in 2018 NDS are as follows:13
•	 Nuclear forces: It endeavours t  modernise its nuclear force by 
developing options to counter competitors’ coercive strategies 
predicated on the threatened use of nuclear or strategic non-nuclear 
attacks.
•	 Space and Cyberspace as Warfighting Domains: It is prioritising the 
building of resilient cyber and space capabilities. It looks at the 
continued integration of these capabilities into the full spectrum 
of military operations. The reconstitution of operations to assure 












the survivability of the assets has manifested in the creation of the 
US Space Command and assigning the status of fighting theatre 
command to the US Cyber Command in 2018.
•	 Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence, 
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR): It contemplates building 
a robust, survivable information ecosystem with an ability to attribute 
and hold accountable state or non-state actors during cyber-attacks. 
The capability spans from tactical to strategic planning to exploit 
information while denying them to the competitors. 
•	 Missile Defence: It looks at layered missile defences and disruptive 
capabilities for missile threats.
•	 Forward Force Manoeuvre and Posture Resilience: While prioritising 
between various forces component, including space, the endeavour 
is to transition into “smaller, dispersed, resilient, adaptive basing that 
include active and passive defences”.14
•	 Advanced Autonomous Systems: It looks at developing military and 
commercial applications in autonomy, artificial intelligence, and 
machine learning to provide competitive military advantages.
•	 Resilient and Agile Logistics: In the face of persistent multi-domain 
attack, it endeavours to create a non-commercially dependent 
distributed logistics and maintenance system to undertake strategic 
mobility and provide sustained logistics support to partner and allies.
US DoD Budgetary Support
2018 NDS guides Defence Budget. The defence budgetary request 
for FY2020 was pegged at US$ 712 billion, while the FY2021 request 
stands at US$ 705 billion.15 It represented 4.9 per cent nominal growth 
(2.8 per cent real growth) over the FY2019 enacted appropriation.16 In 
2018, The US Cyber Command was elevated to become the combatant 
command. It announced the reactivation of US Space Command as a 
unified combatant command. The FY2020 budget request reinforced 
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these actions by recognising the increased importance of space and cyber 
warfighting with additional resources. The budget request for FY2021 
clearly emphasises the “irreversible implementation of 2018 NDS”. The 
significant budget allocation, capability and capacity development in the 
various field made in FY2020 are as follows:17
•	 Space (FY2020 US$ 14.1 billion & FY2021 US$ 18.0 billion): It 
earmarked resources for the expeditious building of the new US Space 
Force HQ. The budget allocation aimed to reduce the risk of satellite 
communications jamming besides increasing the provisions for the 
Global Positioning System, strengthening satellites and operational 
control system, space-based missile warning capabilities and space 
launch capacity.
•	 Cyber (FY2020 US$ 9.6 billion and FY2021 US$ 9.8 billion): The 
intended budget was to support offensive and defensive cyberspace 
operations, modernise DoD’s multi-cloud environment while 
investing in enhancing the cybersecurity capabilities.
•	 Air (FY2020 US$ 57.7 billion and FY2021 US$ 56.9 billion): Besides 
focussing on improving the ISR capabilities, it aimed at increasing 
the capability and capacity of 4th and 5th Generation Aircraft (110 in 
FY2020 and 115 in FY2021), Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air 
Missile (AMRAAM) (389 quantity in FY2020 and 789 in FY2021) 
and Joint Air-Surface Missile—Extended Range (JASM-ER) (430 
quantity in FY2020 and 400 in FY 2021). In FY2021, it has initiated 
five Special Operation Forces Armed Overwatch capability.
•	 Maritime (FY2020 US$ 34.7 billion and FY2021 US$ 32.3 billion): 
The primary focus remains to increase the battle force fleet from 296 to 
314 by FY2024 besides three Virginia Class Submarines. The priority 
also remains to enhance unmanned systems through the introduction 
of two large Unmanned Surface Vehicles (USVs) and stand-off missiles 
like the Long-Range Anti-Ship Missiles (LRASM) (48 quantity) and 
Maritime Strike Tactical Tomahawk (TACTOM) (90 quantity). 












•	 Land (FY2020 US$ 14.6 billion and FY2021 US$ 13.0 billion): 
Instead of firepower getting the priority, the bulk of the fund aims to 
expand ground manoeuvre capacities by adding combat-motorised 
vehicles (6,402 in FY2020), Joint Light Tactical Vehicles (4,090 in 
FY2020 and 4,247 in FY2021) and Amphibious Combat Vehicles 
(56 in FY2020 and 72 in FY2021) for employment by the Marine 
Corps.
•	 Multi-Domain
  Missile De eat and Defence (FY2020 US$13.6 billion and 
FY2021 US$ 20.3 billion): The FY2018 and FY2019 budgets 
helped create a 20-silo missile field in Fort Greely, Alaska. Due 
emphasis is being given to expand the capabilities for Ground-
Based Missile Defences, Terminal High Altitude Area Defence 
(THAAD) interceptors (37 in FY2020 and 41 in FY2021) and 
Aegis Ballistic Missile Defence (SM-3) missiles (37 in FY2020 
and 40 in FY2021) for regional missile defence. A significant 
allocation of US$ 174 million has been made to enhance the 
space-based missile warning and ground control enhancements 
to address hypersonic threats. Substantial allocations have also 
been made to develop boost-phase and advanced technology 
missile defence systems besides directed energy and air-launched 
kinetic interceptors to destroy adversary gr und-based missiles 
prior-to-launch.
  Nuclear Enterprise (FY2020 US$ 14.0 billion and FY2021 US$ 
17.7 billion): The US 2018 Nuclear Posture Review is guiding the 
US nuclear modernisation drive. To keep the US nuclear deterrent 
credible and modernised for decades, the document underscores 
the need for the nuclear triad, recapitalisation of the nuclear-armed 
missiles, submarines, bombers, dual-capable aircraft, and related 
infrastructure. The FY2018 and FY2019 budgets were invested 
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in upgrading the Columbia class ballistic missile submarine (US$ 
2.2 billion), Long Range Standoff Weapon, Ground-Based 
Strategic Deterrent, and B-52 modernisation. The FY2020 
budget focussed on ground-based strategic deterrent (US$ 570 
million), B-21 Bomber (US$ 3 billion), and long-range stand-
off weapon (US$ 712 million). Other areas of modernisation 
include missile warning capabilities, Nuclear Command, Control 
and Communications (NC3) capabilities across the spectrum of 
military operations (US$ 2.5 billion). The US Department of 
Energy, which funds most of the US nuclear programme, shows 
an 11.8 per cent increase in their FY2020 funding to US$ 12.4 
billion.18
  Special Operations Forces (SOF) (FY2020 US$ 3.4 billion and 
FY2021 US$ 3.0 billion): The US began to increasing the SOF 
end-strength by FY2018. The FY2020 budget was dedicated 
to enhance research and development, improve high-end 
warfighting while sustaining Counter-Terrorism (CT) and 
Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) missions. 
Irregular Warfare (IW) was identified as a core competency. 
Accordingly, allocations aim to increase readiness and lethality 
through investment in new technologies. It includes investments 
in Directed Energy (US$ 27.2 million), AC/MC-130J aircraft/
gunships (US$ 342.8 million), CV-22 tilt-rotor aircraft (US$ 
45.3 million) and additional s rface and sub-surface maritime 
craft systems (US$ 105.7 million).
  Technology: The US departments engaged in technology development 
includes the military departments and their laboratories, Federally 
Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs), University 
Affiliated Research Centers (UARCs), and the defence agencies 
like DARPA (Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency). The 
technology development focus of the US military are:












 ¤ Unmanned/Autonomous: To enhance the freedom of 
manoeuvre and lethality in contested environments by 
developing offensive-armed Unmanned Surface Vessel, 
Unmanned Undersea Vehicle and Autonomous Logistics 
Platforms (FY2020 US$ 3.7 billion and FY2021 US$ 1.7 
billion). 
 ¤ Microelectronics/5G and Artificial Intelligence: The US 
unveiled its Artificial Strategy in 2020. It aims to expand 
military advantage with the Joint Artificial Intelligence 
Centre (JAIC) and Advanced Image Recognition (Project 
Maven) (FY2020 US$ 927 million and FY2021 US$ 800 
million). In FY2021, it addresses issues related to the trusted 
and assured supply of microelectronics besides hastening the 
adoption of 5G connectivity for greater network bandwidth 
(FY2021, US$ 1.5 billion).
 ¤ Hypersonic: Pentagon sees its applicability with all three 
services. It aims to enable Air Force Advanced Rapid Response 
Weapon (ARRW), Navy Sea-Launched Conventional Prompt 
Strike, and Army Long Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW) 
by infusing US$ 2.6 billion in FY2020 and US$ 3.2 billion 
in FY2021. 
 ¤ Directed Energy (DE): The US continues with the 
development of offensive and defensive DE capabilities. It 
supports the implementation of DE for base defence, enables 
testing and procurement of multiple types of lasers, and has 
increased its research and development for scalable high-
power density applications (FY2020 US$ 235 million).
 ¤ Quantum Technology: The quantum technology race is likely 
to determine the future of technology. Quantum cryptography 
and communications create unhackable networks. The massive 
quantum computing capabilities create innumerable possibilities 
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of cracking prevalent encryption and better discrimination 
which may sound the death knell for stealth technology. 
Notable progress in quantum radar, sensing, imaging, 
metrology and navigation will enable greater precision and 
sensitivity. Quantum materials, such as topological insulators, 
can improve quantum computing. Quantum research is a long-
term vision by China as it plans to spend more on R&D by 
2030 than any other country.19 The US is worried that any gains 
by the Chinese in quantum technologies could alter the future 
military and strategic balance of power. The 2019 ‘Worldwide 
Threat Assessment’ report to the US Senate points out how 
the quantum cryptography networks could frustrate US cyber 
intrusion and signals intelligence capabilities. Hence, the US 
has authorised the National Quantum Initiative Act (NQI) to 
invest US$ 1.2 billion in quantum information science over five 
years. US Department of Energy has announced another US$ 
80 million for quantum research. US DARPA budget of US$ 
3.6 billion in FY2020 is devoted to critical technologies like AI 
and Quantum.20 
Lessons for India
Non-contact warfare is testing the threshold of violence and the use of 
force. It has altered the way countries look to settle p litical disputes and 
conflicts. A country like India with two nuclear neighbours, unsettled 
active borders across two fronts, and an ongoing proxy war need to 
plan for a two and half front war as part of a typically traditional security 
outlook. However, the expanded security landscape led by cyber and 
space and guided by the new generation technologies of quantum, 
AI and 5G can compress the window of application from tactical to 
the strategic level. The engineered conflicts pose new challenges in 
the non-traditional security arena. In this area, the armed forces have 












no jurisdiction or little participation as yet. Hence, national security 
strategy, whether declared or not, is essential to guide future force 
design.
Non-contact warfare aims at subverting the politico-eco-social 
systems. It targets the edifices of national power like finance, industries, 
commerce, critical technologies, critical resources for new materials, 
energy grids, transportation, information highway, influence engine 
within a country like media, academia, political entities, NGOs and 
societal peace. As part of the national security strategy, the PLA and 
Pakistan Army have developed sub-threshold capabilities to engage their 
adversaries in a grey-zone conflict or proxy war. The intent is clear- to 
keep the adversary engaged in an endless battle at the sub-threshold level 
and prevent the conflict from spiralling out. The operational environment 
created by them aims to achieve strategic stability while continuing with 
the resistance and offence at the operational and tactical level. 
The immediate question confronting India is: Where does the security 
problem lie? How well is India equipped to safeguard its population and 
interests? Should the western-styled Indian Army continue to work in its 
traditional space or look for a non-traditional security mandate? As India 
develops economically, it will have to manage strategic friction. Hence, it 
requires a doctrinal approach to security, better civil-military integration, 
technological innovation, a better defence industrial base and robust law 
enforcement. 
The stakes for security will increase as India grows. It will entail 
a need for better civil-military synergy, the ability to safeguard the 
sovereignty of new domains like data, technology, space and outer space 
and deep-sea besides traditional security domains and above all, the 
creation of asymmetric capabilities. India will do well to manage its fault 
lines and create alliances and partnership, which will usher in stability and 
guarantee security. India has to be prepared for Non-contact warfare as 
it is the future of war, and it needs a whole-of-a-government approach. 
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According to Indian Chief of Army Staff General MM Naravane, “victory 
no longer rests on the ability to inflict massive destruction but on the 
ability to wrestle popular support from one’s opponent”.21
Examining the US and China and the US and Russia powerplay, 
it is evident that the thrust for fighting the protracted conflict lies in 
increasing the strategic space of contest. The reliance will be to engage 
the adversary across multiple domains while maintaining force parity. 
It has been observed that the approach to warfare becomes aggressive 
if the force asymmetry is significant, e.g., Russia and Ukraine and the 
US and Iraq engagements. India must therefore undertake capability 
and capacity building based on the security profiling of its adversaries. 
National security is the cumulative sum of a collaborative effort across 
PIMED (political, intelligence, military, economic and diplomacy). The 
world is still wedded to balance of power syndrome. Hence military will 
continue to be the pivot over which nations will play the hardball.
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